Wittgenstein published only one book review. And that was devastating.

Wittgenstein was still only twenty-four, and officially an undergraduate reading for a BA, when he was asked to review a textbook on logic – The Science of Logic by P. Coffey – for the Cambridge Review. This is the only book review he ever published, and the first published record of his philosophical opinions. In it he presents a Russellian dismissal of the Aristotelian logic advanced by Coffey, but expresses himself with a stridency that exceeds even Russell’s, and borders on the vitriolic:

In no branch of learning can an author disregard the results of honest research with so much impunity as he can in Philosophy and Logic. To this circumstance we owe the publication of such a book as Mr Coffey’s ‘Science of Logic’, and only as a typical example of the work of many logicians of to-day does this book deserve consideration. The author’s Logic is that of the scholastic philosophers and he makes all their mistakes – of course with the usual references to Aristotle. (Aristotle, whose name is so much taken in vain by our logicians, would turn in his grave if he knew that so many Logicians know no more about Logic to-day than he did 2,000 years ago.) The author has not taken the slightest notice of the great work of the modern mathematical logicians – work which has brought about an advance in Logic comparable only to that which made Astronomy out of Astrology, and Chemistry out of Alchemy. 

Mr Coffey, like many logicians, draws a great advantage from an unclear way of expressing himself; for if you cannot tell whether he means to say ‘Yes’ or ‘No’, it is difficult to argue against him. However, even through his foggy expression, many grave mistakes can be recognised clearly enough; and I propose to give a list of some of the most striking ones, and would advise the student of Logic to trace these mistakes and their consequences in other books on Logic also.

There follows a list of such mistakes, which are, for the most part, the weaknesses of traditional (Aristotelian) logic customarily pointed out by adherents of Russellian mathematical logic – for instance, that it assumes all propositions to be of the subject-predicate form, that it confuses the copula ‘is’ (as in ‘Socrates is mortal’) with the ‘is’ of identity (‘Twice two is four’), and so on. ‘The worst of such books as this’, the review concludes, ‘is that they prejudice sensible people against the study of Logic.’ By ‘sensible people’ Wittgenstein presumably meant people with some sort of training in mathematics and the sciences, as opposed to the classical training we can probably assume Mr Coffey (along with most traditional logicians) to have had.

(Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius - Ray Monk)