Ettstraße 2
80333 München
Jan. 16, 2017
Complaint Letter regarding confiscation of a mobile phone without Court order
To whom it may concern,
This letter is in conjunction with my letter of Nov. 21, 2016.
On October 28, 2015 at 7:40 am, two armed policemen Carstens and Bendig and policewoman Nöchel, confiscated our complete IT equipment based on a Court order of Munich Judge Pabst. They also confiscated my mobile phone and they sniffed around for further mobile phones. The policewoman was obviously commissioned to confiscate my Tibetan daughter's mobile phone as well. I was subjected to a physical search and this was also planned with my daughter.
The Court order did NOT mention the confiscation of mobile phones!
The case file of the Munich prosecution includes my contact list and also states that my SIM card had been examined. This means that information has been retrieved illegally of when, how long, and with whom I have phoned.
The evaluation of the data stored in the mobile phone has infringed my constitutional right to self-determination (Article 2 (1) in conjunction with Article 1 (1) of the Basic Law) and Section 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (§ 100 STPO).
"The information as to whether, when and how often telecommunication connections has been or has been attempted between telecommunications connections, is one of the communication instances shielded from state knowledge by Article 10 (1) of the Basic Law Of the communication medium is confidential in all respects (see BVerfGE 67, 157 <172>, 85, 386 <396>, 100, 313 <358>, 107, 299 <312 f.>, Decision of the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of 3. March 2004 - 1 BvF 3/92 -, NJW 2004, p. 2213 <2215>). " (Excerpt from decision of 4 February 2005 - 2 BvR 308/04)In a decision of February 4, 2005 (2 BvR 308/04), the Federal Constitutional Court has specified clear conditions under which the investigating authorities may evaluate the data stored on a mobile phone when the mobile telephone is secured during a home search.
"Authorizations to interfere with the basic right under Article 10 (1) of the Basic Law are subject to a legal basis pursuant to Article 10 (2), first sentence, of the Basic Law (Art. 10 Abs. 2 Satz 1 GG), which specifies the purpose, the scope and the limits of the interference, (See BVerfGE 100, 313 <359 f.>, Decision of the First Senate of the Federal Constitutional Court of March 3) 2004 - 1 BvF 3/92 -, NJW 2004, p. 2213 <2215>)." (1)The German Constitutional Court states further:
"Section 100g and 100h of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafgesetz) are relevant for the determination of a criminal offense (§§ 100g para 1 sentence 1, 100a sentence 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure) (§ 100h para. 1 sentence 3, 100b para. 1 StPO), the business telecommunication service providers may be obliged to provide information on the connection data.The information request is subordinated to other investigations (section 100g para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), the Act does not loosen the requirements of §§ 100g and 100h of the Code of Criminal Procedure for the enforced disclosure of the connection data, but the requirement of a section- Precise and standardized limitation of the interference if the investigating authorities were able to resort to a different enforcement measure which is subject to lower requirements with respect to the ordering procedure in order to achieve the same objective, namely the involuntary disclosure of the obligations imposed by Article 10 (1) GG protected data. § 100g para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure can therefore be interpreted as meaning that a request for information is inadmissible if the facts in question, such as the whereabouts of the accused, are to be clarified by means of other investigations which do not have access to telecommunications connection data. If, however, access is made to connection data, which is concealed by the investigating authorities in its private sphere, in contrast to the information request, § 100g para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not release the restrictions on which a request for information depends. "
"The limitation function of sections 100g and 100h of the Code of Criminal Procedure based on Article 10 (2) of the Basic Law prohibits the investigating authorities from circumventing the substantive and procedural restrictions laid down therein by the choice of another compulsory measure which is not subject to such restrictions The personal data of the accused of the telecommunication service provider or in electronic memories of the communication devices, the confiscation of these data carriers, of the invoices and devices, may only be carried out under the conditions of §§ 100g, 100h StPO The disclosure of the link data, imposed by confiscation of the defendant and the exploitation of the confiscated data carriers, is therefore also limited to criminal investigations of considerable importance and requires a judicial decision which, in the event of danger, is caused by an order of the public prosecutor, But not the police." (1)This illegal confiscation of a mobile phone is a profound intervention and is reminiscent of the Nazi era. The planned confiscation of my daughter's mobile phone in conjunction with a body search bears all the hallmarks of Nazi era "Sippenhaft" or collective punishment.
The policemen/woman were acting unauthorized and under the assumption that a Hartz 4 recipient was in any case intellectually inferior, could be bullied, and above all, he would be lacking the financial resources in order to gain his legal rights. Thus arbitrariness could be applied without fear of any legal repercussions. Just like under Adolf Hitler.
On Nov. 22, 2016 I have filed a criminal complaint in Munich against said policemen/woman.
This was the second confiscation of computers based on criminal complaints by German government employment authorities that infringe my constitutionally guaranteed right to free speech. I can not help but notice that there exists a conspicuous fraternity between the German government agencies Jobcenter and the Labor Agency BA together with police and Bavarian Courts. It all has the smell of collusion.
It should be noted that in 2014 Jobcenter Munich employee Jean-Marc Vincent, under the guise of proffering assistance, had tried to obtain private data from my daughter such as her email address and possibly also her mobile phone number. Coincidence? The underlying case against me was vigorously pursued by the Munich Court. A complaint has been filed by us in 2016 with the European Court of Human Rights.
Allow me to conclude that I am deeply saddened by the racism of Germans and especially by the institutional racism in this strange country Germany. It is not my country.
I believe we both agree this subject merits an answer and I am eagerly looking forward.
Sincerely,
_______________
(1) Google translate
Keine Kommentare:
Kommentar veröffentlichen
Hinweis: Nur ein Mitglied dieses Blogs kann Kommentare posten.