In addition, confiscation of smartphone without court order no concern for "Euro clowns" at ECHR (Case 51482/18)

Great headline, right? Gathered it from Erik Voeten (more below):

"This scrutiny is sometimes targeted at individual judges. For example, the popular British tabloid The Sun individually singled out the “Euro clowns” it held responsible for the decision to stay the extradition of radical Muslim cleric Abu Hamza to the United States.9 (Hamza claimed he faced the prospect of torture in a U.S. prison.)"

Here is a measured post about that SUN headline “Euro Clowns Let Hamza off the Hook,” August 7, 2008. Still, I like the moniker 'Euro Clowns' as the EU totally gets on my balls. Having outed myself again, here is the

Relevant excerpt from our complaint submitted to the ECHR:

Subject Art 8 ECHR

A confiscation of the smartphone was not mentioned in the Judicial Decision of October 8, 2015. Nevertheless, it was confiscated by the police and it can also be assumed, the same was planned with the smartphone of his daughter, as a policewoman was present. Despite this unlawfulness, Judge Birkhofer-Hoffmann showed a keen interest in the results of the evaluation of phone data. For Hartz 4 recipients no rights seem to apply.

In a decision of February 4, 2005 - 2 BvR 308/04, the Federal Constitutional Court stated in paragraph 23 to 25 clear limits for a confiscation. On Nov. 22, 2016, the applicant filed a criminal complaint against police officer Carstens at the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office. Furthermore, he sent two Pdf to the police chief of Munich, which was allegedly handed to the prosecutor by the police according to their letter of April 26, 2017. The complainant has no correspondence with the file # 120 Js 119571/17, as was claimed by senior prosecutor Tilmann in the letter of June 1,2017 and again confirmed on Oct. 19, 2017. Everything was swept under the carpet.

To give that single-judge decision (Case 51482/18) the right twist we at the ECHR simply

"shall not keep the file in its archives for more than one year from the date of this decision."

There is an interesting paragraph in "The European Court of Human Rights: What It Is, How It Works, and Its Future" by McKaskle, Paul L. (2005) that explains the workings inside the ECHR and the national component. The pivot is the Registrar and his/her staff!

In the Strasbourg Court, however, the Registrar's staff is answerable to the Registrar, and not to individual judges. The Registrar's staff prepares the initial analysis of all cases, is present in Chamber deliberations, and probably prepares most opinions of the Court. What effect this relationship has on the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court is impossible for an outsider to know. For some judges the effect may well be minimal or non-existent. But it is possible that the staff views might have an effect on new judges or judges not entirely comfortable with the English or French language. 168 Extensive use of a central legal staff may also result in greater bureaucratic or institutional decision-making.

Second, in part, the legal staff (serving as the equivalent of an American law clerk) does carry out duties typical of the position, such as an analysis of each application filed with the Court as to whether it should be admissible because the allegations suggest that there has been a violation of the Convention. But the duties go further. Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Rules of Court, the Registrar or his designee is present during deliberations of a Committee, Chamber, or Grand Chamber. (171) The rules provide that "only judges shall take part in the deliberations,"' but it is not hard to imagine that many questions may well be put to the Registrar or other legal staff present, and thus the responses of staff constitute a de facto participation.

171. ECHR Rules, supranote 40, R. 22. Rule 22 also provides that "other officials of the Registry and interpreters whose assistance is deemed necessary" may also be present during deliberations. Id. In the United States Supreme Court, law clerks never participate in conferences, and such a practice is extremely rare in the California Supreme Court.

Even more embarrassing is this part in a footnote:

 I have been told by lawyers familiar with the Court that they have seen applications that did ap- pear to present serious issues but which were, nevertheless, rejected as "manifestly ill- founded." Since rejected applications are not easily accessible for public inspection, it is impossible to determine whether this is a systematic occurrence or are isolated events-or are simply mistakes of the observers as to whether the rejected applications are, in fact, meritorious. 

The ECHR employs double standards in the form of leniency towards "high-reputation states", or make that EU paymasters.

Importantly for the purposes of this paper, international courts are also advised to treat different states differently. States that enjoy a high-reputation for compliance with international law pose a greater threat to the court. Their non-compliance or even their criticism can significantly harm the court's reputation. To counter this threat, international courts treat high-reputation states more leniently than they do low-reputation states. They will reserve their most demanding judgments—especially those that are based on doctrinal novelties—to states that have a low-reputation.

Here is ERIK VOETEN, Georgetown University, with "The Impartiality of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights"

"About one-third of all applications are dismissed for procedural reasons by the registry. Another 60% of applications are declared inadmissible by unanimous decision of a committee of three judges, most frequently because the applicant had not exhausted domestic judicial remedies. Admissibility decisions are based on the recommendation of a rapporteur, which is usually the national judge of the respondent government, granting that judge considerable leverage over national cases."

The myth of the independent judge.

"Cultural factors could also be responsible for the apparent national bias of international judges. For example, Hensley (1968) attributes national bias on the ICJ to “the more subtle influence of culturally inculcated values” (p. 568), although he does not specify a precise mechanism through which culture has such an effect. One plausible mechanism is that judges who are accustomed to political interference domestically are more likely to defer to the position of their government when serving on an international court."

And let's not forget the fucking stupid criminal civil servant Jürgen Sonneck alias "C. Paucher". Covered by Munich police and the rotten Munich Court. Roland Freisler would admire them blokes.

Hi, my name is Jürgen Sonneck.
I do not always use a false name but when I do, I make sure
I come come across as totally fucking bonkers.

ECHR Single-judge Decisions always lead to an Inadmissibility decision???