Informational Autocrats

This paper touches important issues in the information age. Incidentally, the German Constitutional Court is to decide about the mandatory media fee GEZ on July 18. It has already cautioned that it is not going to be abolished. Heaven forbid, the red-robed know their duties.

Informational Autocrats

Abstract

In recent decades, dictatorships based on mass repression have largely given way to a new model based on the manipulation of information. Instead of terrorizing citizens into submission, "informational autocrats" artificially boost their popularity by convincing the public they are competent. To do so, they use propaganda and silence informed members of the elite by co-optation or censorship. Using several sources--including a newly created dataset of authoritarian control techniques--we document a range of trends in recent autocracies that fit the theory: a decline in violence, efforts to conceal state repression, rejection of official ideologies, imitation of democracy, a perceptions gap between masses and elite, and the adoption by leaders of a rhetoric of performance rather than one aimed at inspiring fear.

The emergence of such softer, non-ideological autocracies was unexpected and so far lacks a systematic explanation. How do the new dictators survive without using the standard tools of 20th century authoritarians, and without the traditional legitimacy or religious sanction that supported historical monarchs, or even the revolutionary charisma of anti-colonial leaders?

We suggest an answer. The key to such regimes, we argue, is the manipulation of information. Rather than terrorizing or indoctrinating the population, rulers survive by leading citizens to believe—rationally but incorrectly—that they are competent and benevolent. Having won popularity, dictators score points both at home and abroad by mimicking democracy. Violent repression, rather than helping, is counterproductive: it undercuts the image of able governance that leaders seek to cultivate.

It is suggested to understand the term 'dictator' in the widest possible sense, perhaps politician.

The modern dilemma

With regard to modernization, rulers face a dilemma. The expansion of the educated class continually raises the cost of silencing it via cooptation or censorship. Yet blocking modernization—and the associated income growth—increases citizens’ doubts about the regime’s competence. Informational autocrats therefore struggle to find a balance between exploiting new opportunities and resisting economic progress out of fear that its political and social spillovers could threaten the regime’s control. They respond by stepping up propaganda and censorship, seeking to improve their effectiveness. In the long run, modernization renders a more democratic order the only viable option.

However, it is hard to predict exactly when a transition from informational autocracy to democracy will occur.

Or vice versa. Paper is a little one-sided.