Does economic inequality breed political inequality?

ABSTRACT

Does economic inequality generate political inequality? While there is a large literature on the effect of inequality on regime change and support for democracy, there is little research on its effect on political equality across socioeconomic positions. Yet democracy and political equality, although related, are distinct concepts. While political power tends to be more evenly distributed in democracies than in autocracies, there is substantial variation in both regime types. This study argues that economic inequality should decrease political equality through multiple mechanisms: (1) it increases the resources of the rich relative to the poor; (2) it widens the gap in policy preferences across income groups; (3) it reduces participation; and (4) it depresses support for democracy. Using three measures of inequality and data on more than 140 countries between 1961 and 2008, it was found that economic inequality tends to increase political inequality, even when one controls for the level of democracy. Results hold when the sample is restricted by regime type. Finally, evidence in favour of the mechanisms is provided.

Reduced participation is debatable. Participation may even come from unexpected quarters. After all, it does not happen often that a president of a Constitutional Court steps up and poses as a language policeman.

President Vosskuhle, pissed about defunct AC and language restraint.

So some days ago the President of Germany's Federal Constitutional Court Mr Vosskuhle felt obliged to prove that economic inequality will rather INcrease political equality and participation. To that end the mouthpiece Sueddeutsche Zeitung was only too eager to lend him some pixel real estate.

"The constitutional court president calls terms such as "anti-deportation industry" unacceptable."

and further on in Die Zeit:

"So he was addressed about the term "rule of injustice", with which the CSU leader Horst Seehofer had attacked Chancellor Angela Merkel (CDU) in February 2016. He considered such a rhetoric unacceptable, Voßkuhle told the SZ."

This goes to show that economic inequality can bring political participation to such a !evel where Article 5 Basic Law seems to be forgotten. Even by someone charged to protect it.

Speaking of inequality, is there some sort of relation with productivity?

Slower Productivity and Higher Inequality: Are They Related?

Informational Autocrats

This paper touches important issues in the information age. Incidentally, the German Constitutional Court is to decide about the mandatory media fee GEZ on July 18. It has already cautioned that it is not going to be abolished. Heaven forbid, the red-robed know their duties.

Informational Autocrats

Abstract

In recent decades, dictatorships based on mass repression have largely given way to a new model based on the manipulation of information. Instead of terrorizing citizens into submission, "informational autocrats" artificially boost their popularity by convincing the public they are competent. To do so, they use propaganda and silence informed members of the elite by co-optation or censorship. Using several sources--including a newly created dataset of authoritarian control techniques--we document a range of trends in recent autocracies that fit the theory: a decline in violence, efforts to conceal state repression, rejection of official ideologies, imitation of democracy, a perceptions gap between masses and elite, and the adoption by leaders of a rhetoric of performance rather than one aimed at inspiring fear.

The emergence of such softer, non-ideological autocracies was unexpected and so far lacks a systematic explanation. How do the new dictators survive without using the standard tools of 20th century authoritarians, and without the traditional legitimacy or religious sanction that supported historical monarchs, or even the revolutionary charisma of anti-colonial leaders?

We suggest an answer. The key to such regimes, we argue, is the manipulation of information. Rather than terrorizing or indoctrinating the population, rulers survive by leading citizens to believe—rationally but incorrectly—that they are competent and benevolent. Having won popularity, dictators score points both at home and abroad by mimicking democracy. Violent repression, rather than helping, is counterproductive: it undercuts the image of able governance that leaders seek to cultivate.

It is suggested to understand the term 'dictator' in the widest possible sense, perhaps politician.

The modern dilemma

With regard to modernization, rulers face a dilemma. The expansion of the educated class continually raises the cost of silencing it via cooptation or censorship. Yet blocking modernization—and the associated income growth—increases citizens’ doubts about the regime’s competence. Informational autocrats therefore struggle to find a balance between exploiting new opportunities and resisting economic progress out of fear that its political and social spillovers could threaten the regime’s control. They respond by stepping up propaganda and censorship, seeking to improve their effectiveness. In the long run, modernization renders a more democratic order the only viable option.

However, it is hard to predict exactly when a transition from informational autocracy to democracy will occur.

Or vice versa. Paper is a little one-sided.