Posts mit dem Label Bertrand Russell werden angezeigt. Alle Posts anzeigen
Posts mit dem Label Bertrand Russell werden angezeigt. Alle Posts anzeigen

2/02/2019

Bertrand Russell in 1933 on why people (today) are xenophobic

Over at NAUTILUS it reads:
On this past International Holocaust Remembrance Day, I reread a bit of Bertrand Russell. In 1933, dismayed at the Nazification of Germany, the philosopher wrote “The Triumph of Stupidity,” attributing the rise of Adolf Hitler to the organized fervor of stupid and brutal people—two qualities, he noted, that “usually go together.” He went on to make one of his most famous observations, that the “fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt.”
Here I want to point to another subject he touched. In 1933 Bertrand Russell wrote the following piece and it explains the reason why people (today) are xenophobic. Why they objectify their hatred with such mundane things like the head scarf, way of dressing, a burka they may encounter perhaps one or two times in year, or the arranged marriage. As if Westerners do not arrange their partnerships based on economic, educational considerations, and/or (political) beliefs. Please take notice of the Oxford comma, thank you. Or all dress in fucking boring jeans. Neoliberalism with the intrinsic competition and economic insecurity asks for a scape goat. Here is Betrand Russell in 1933:

Mortals and Others: Bertrand Russell's American Essays, 1931-1935, Volume 2

On Race Hatred 

Recent events in Germany have brought to the fore the hatred of Christians for jews which existed everywhere in the Middle Ages but which in England and America has lost most of its virulence. Both the English and the Americans have been surprised and shocked to find that in a nation which considers itself in the forefront of civilisation so brutal and pointless an emotion can have such strength. 

But, in fact, wherever diverse races mix, the feeling of race hatred is apt to grow up. Negroes and Mongolians suffer from it in America. The English have no occasion for it at home since the population is racially homogeneous, but they develop it at once when they go to South Africa. All primitive races feel it and are apt to kill strangers merely because they are strangers. 

How far is this feeling instinctive, and how far does it have other sources? There is a story by Joseph Conrad called 'An Outcast of the Islands', where a white man falls desperately in love with a native girl, but after he has lived with her for a while he comes to hate her on account of her strangeness. 

This sort of situation suggests the existence of an instinctive element, but there is no doubt that many other factors contribute to the politically important forms of race antagonism. Wherever it becomes powerful, economic motives invariably play an important part. In the case of the hatred of Jews, this is obvious and admitted. The Chinese and Japanese were hated in California because they were willing to accept a lower standard of life. In the case of the Negroes, it can hardly be said that there is race hatred in the proper sense of the word: so long as they are content to accept a properly subordinate position, they are well liked, and it is only when they make an attempt to assert equal rights that white men become hostile to them. The desire for domination is a different thing from race hatred, though it easily passes over into it as soon as domination becomes precarious. 


Mortals and Others 

I think myself that what is instinctive in race hatred is fear: fear of anything strange, fear of anything threatening our established way of living. When there is no occasion for fear, race hatred does not arise. If the world were stable and everyone's economic position were secure. I do not for a moment believe that the different races of the world would hate each other. 

During the last two hundred years it has been customary to speak of the benefits derived from competition and economic insecurity as sources of industry and effort. But competition and economic insecurity have other effects which have been less noticed although they are becoming more important. These effects are connected with fear and the consequent hatred. This is particularly grave in the matter of race hatred since the world is becoming more and more of an economic unity and therefore the occasions for race hatred are increasing. 

Race hatred is one of the most cruel and least civilised emotions to which men in the mass are liable, and it is of the utmost importance for human progress that every possible method of diminishing it should be adopted. The most potent of such methods undoubtedly would be economic security. It should be realised, even at this moment when we are all suffering from economic insecurity, that there is no technical difficulty in establishing security for all. The difficulties that stand in the way are, on the one hand, a belief in competition as a good thing and, on the other, the determination of the more fortunate races and classes not to allow equality to others even though there should be no loss to themselves. 

I fear that in this particular matter of the conflict between races, a number of bitter lessons will be needed before men learn that kindliness and tolerance are not only virtues but indispensable means to our own happiness. 

24 May I933

2/23/2018

"Will you please tell me if I am a complete idiot?"

He would, according to Russell, ‘pace up and down my room like a wild beast for three hours in agitated silence’. (1)



"When we do philosophy we are like savages, primitive people, who hear the expressions of civilized men, put a false interpretation on them, and then draw the queerest conclusions from it."

Wittgenstein, PI §194

(1) Ray Monk: Wittgenstein

10/14/2017

Wittgenstein gave Russell a pretty hard time in the beginning

My German friend threatens to be an infliction, he came back with me after my lecture & argued till dinner-time – obstinate & perverse, but I think not stupid.8 [19.10.11]

My German engineer very argumentative & tiresome. He wouldn’t admit that it was certain that there was not a rhinoceros in the room … [He] came back and argued all the time I was dressing.9 [1.11.11 ]

My German engineer, I think, is a fool.10 He thinks nothing empirical is knowable – I asked him to admit that there was not a rhinoceros in the room, but he wouldn’t. [2.11.11]

[Wittgenstein] was refusing to admit the existence of anything except asserted propositions.11 [7.11.11]

My lecture went off all right. My German ex-engineer, as usual, maintained his thesis that there is nothing in the world except asserted propositions, but at last I told him it was too large a theme.12 [13.11.11]

My ferocious German came and argued at me after my lecture. He is armour-plated against all assaults of reasoning. It is really rather a waste of time talking with him.13 [16.11.11]

Excerpt from Monk - Ludwig Wittgenstein: The duty og Genius.

Russell learnt only later that Wittgenstein was Austrian, not German.

(The book is an excellent read. The NYT has a review "Give Him Genius or Give Him Death".)

6/13/2016

“Why I Am Not a Christian.”

Teapot
Betrand Russell in a 1927 speech “Why I Am Not a Christian.”

As your Chairman has told you, the subject about which I am going to speak to you tonight is ‘Why I am not a Christian’. Perhaps it would be as well, first of all, to try to make out what one means by the word ‘Christian’. It is used these days in a very loose sense by a great many people. Some people mean no more by it than a person who attempts to live a good life. In that sense I suppose there would be Christians in all sects and creeds; but I do not think that that is the proper sense of the word, if only because it would imply that all the people who are not Christians—all the Buddhists, Confucians, Mohammedans, and so on—are not trying to live a good life. I do not mean by a Christian any person who tries to live decently according to his lights. I think that you must have a certain amount of definite belief before you have a right to call yourself a Christian. The word does not have quite such a full-blooded meaning now as it had in the times of St Augustine and St Thomas Aquinas. In those days, if a man said that he was a Christian it was known what he meant. You accepted a whole collection of creeds which were set out with great precision, and every single syllable of those creeds you believed with the whole strength of your convictions.

WHAT IS A CHRISTIAN?

Nowadays it is not quite that. We have to be a little more vague in our meaning of Christianity. I think, however, that there are two different items which are quite essential to anybody calling himself a Christian. The first is one of a dogmatic nature—namely, that you must believe in God and immortality. If you do not believe in those two things, I do not think that you can properly call yourself a Christian. Then, further than that, as the name implies, you must have some kind of belief about Christ. The Mohammedans, for instance, also believe in God and in immortality, and yet they would not call themselves Christians. I think you must have at the very lowest the belief that Christ was, if not divine, at least the best and wisest of men. If you are not going to believe that much about Christ, I do not think you have any right to call yourself a Christian.


WHAT WE MUST DO

We want to stand upon our own feet and look fair and square at the world—its good facts, its bad facts, its beauties, and its ugliness; see the world as it is, and be not afraid of it. Conquer the world by intelligence, and not merely by being slavishly subdued by the terror that comes from it. The whole conception of God is a conception derived from the ancient Oriental despotisms. It is a conception quite unworthy of free men. When you hear people in church debasing themselves and saying that they are miserable sinners, and all the rest of it, it seems contemptible and not worthy of self-respecting human beings. We ought to stand up and look the world frankly in the face. We ought to make the best we can of the world, and if it is not so good as we wish, after all it will still be better than what these others have made of it in all these ages. A good world needs knowledge, kindliness, and courage; it does not need a regretful hankering after the past, or a fettering of the free intelligence by the words uttered long ago by ignorant men. It needs a fearless outlook and a free intelligence. It needs hope for the future, not looking back all the time towards a past that is dead, which we trust will be far surpassed by the future that our intelligence can create.